Developing democratic criteria for veto points in a democratic system, and comparing them to each other against these criteria, Lemieux and Watkins yield fresh insights into judicial review's democratic value. "A wonderful blend of normative and empirical analysis, which asks important questions about whether the judicial review we experience meets democratic standards, as opposed to the more common concern of whether an idealized form of judicial review might meet democratic standards."-Mark A. Graber, Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law "Creatively blending political theory and institutional analysis, Watkins and Lemieux show why tired arguments over the dangers of judicial activism overlook the courts' crucial function of protecting democracy from political failures. Their repositioning of courts as unique but fundamentally political institutions challenges both conventional legal and political science understandings of judicial behavior. The book reconfigures American politics by bringing the courts into the picture as necessary partners in ensuring democratic legitimacy and preventing domination."-Julie Novkov, Professor of Political Science and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University at Albany "This pioneering book challenges conventional thinking about judicial review and moves the field in an exciting new direction. It dismantles minimalist and 'instructions for judges' approaches rooted in the wrong-headed countermajoritarian paradigm and redirects our attention to how well courts, as compared to other veto points, contribute to the anti-domination aim of democracy. The authors' approach---simultaneously theoretical, practical, and comparative---yields properly modest conclusions about the virtues and vices of judicial review."-Terri Peretti, Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara University